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SUBSTANCE DUALISM AND 
DISEMBODIED EXISTENCE 
Nicholas Everitt 
In a number of places, Richard Swinburne has defended the logical possibility 
of perception without a body; and has inferred from this logical possibility that 
substance dualism is true. I challenge his defence of disembodied perception 
by arguing that a disembodied perceiver would not be able to distinguish 
between perceptions and hallucinations. I then claim that even if disembodied 
perception were possible, this could not be used to support substance dualism: 
such an inference would be either invalid or question-begging. 
I 
Substance dualism, that most unpopular of current theories of mind, continues 
to find interesting and able defenders.! I shall focus on one set of arguments 
supplied by one of the current defenders, and I shall argue that these argu-
ments fail. That in itself is a matter of some interest, since it is always reassur-
ing to be able to demonstrate that unpopular doctrines are rightly unpopular. 
But I hope that a further interest will attach to the refutation, in that it will 
invoke some relatively unfamiliar thoughts about the nature of perception. 
My stalking horse in this exercise will Richard Swinburne. Swinburne 
has defended substance dualism on a number of occasions, and very often 
by appealing to quite different sets of arguments. In The Coherence of Theism, 
for example, substance dualism is defended by an argument by elimination: 
it emerges as the only theory which will enable us to avoid crippling defi-
ciencies in all its rivals. In Is There A God? and The Evolution of the Soul, the 
theory is defended by an appeal to thought experiments about brain trans-
plants. In Personal Identity, and again in The Evolution of the Soul, it is by an 
appeal to the possibility of disembodied consciousness. I will focus on the 
argument from the possibility of disembodied consciousness, as this seems 
to be the line of argument which Swinburne finds most convincing. The 
original argument of Personal Identity, for example, is repeated in his 1996 
paper "Dualism Intact", again (in slightly revised form) in the second edition 
of The Evolution of the Soul, and is endorsed again in his most recent publica-
tion on the topic, his 1998 paper "The Modal Argument Is Not Circular."! 
II 
The central argument in PI for substance dualism can be simply stated, in 
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what 1 will call the Basic Argument: 
1. It is logically possible for me to continue to exist without my body 
or any part of it such as my brain. 
This is understood to mean: 
2. "I exist in a world in which my body does not exist" is not self-
contradictory. So 
3. 1 (now, here) already have some non-bodily component, whose 
persistence is the persistence of me. So 
4. 1 (now) have a non-bodily mind, a mental substance, a soul. 
When we examine the details of Swinburne's argument, it can seem at 
first as if 1. should be taken to mean simply that 1 can continue to exist 
without the body which I now have. But as his argument proceeds, it 
becomes clear that he intends 1. in the sense that I can continue to exist 
with no body at all. So those who believe that at every moment at which 1 
exist, 1 must have some body or other, but not necessarily the same body 
all the time, would not be conceding as much as Swinburne is claiming 
with premise 1. That this is so is clear from the fact that his conclusion (i.e. 
that 1 can exist as a non-bodily soul) is incompatible with the claim that I 
must be embodied at every moment of my existence. 
Suppose the above argument is intended as an argument designed to 
convert to dualism someone who is initially neutral on the issue, or is even 
a committed anti-dualist. The argument then seems open to an immediate 
objection: surely the premise is too strong. Someone who is uncertain 
between some form of materialism and substance dualism is unlikely to 
regard 1. as uncontroversially true; for if they were certain of 1., they 
might think that 3. and 4. would obviously follow, and they would thus, 
contrary to hypothesis, not be uncertain between materialism and sub-
stance dualism. 1 shall argue later that this line of thought would be a mis-
take, i.e. that it is disputable whether 3. and 4. do follow from 1. at all. But 
there is a good deal of initial plausibility in the thought that 1. is too rich a 
premise: why would anyone who has not already decided that substance 
dualism is true accept 1.? 
Swinburne implicitly recognises the force of this objection, and seeks to 
show that 1. is true, by using considerations which he thinks have indepen-
dent strength. Although all that his basic argument needs is the premise 
that a person can exist without a body, he seeks to show that this premise is 
acceptable by arguing for the stronger claim that a person can perceive 
without a body. He offers an analysis of those relations between me and 
my body in virtue of which we say that one particular body is mine; and 
then argues that it is possible for me to continue to exist even when those 
relations do not hold between me and any body at all, i.e. when I do not 
have a body at all. I will produce in sections III and IV two arguments, 
which I will call the argument from embodiment and the argument from 
location, challenging the possibility of disembodied perception. Then in 
section V, I will argue that even if neither of those arguments works, and 
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hence that we have no reason to reject premise 1. above, neither 2. nor 3. 
will follow. In section VI, I will consider a possible objection to the argu-
ment of section V, and then in section VII I will reply to that objection. 
Section VIII will deal with a more general objection to the argument of the 
paper. Finally, in section IX, I will relate my criticism to the most recently 
published criticism of the argument and to Swinburne's reply. 
III 
First, then, what are the relations between me and a particular human 
body in virtue of which that body is mine? Swinburne invokes two sets of 
characteristics, one to do with intentional action, the other to do with per-
ception. First, there is one and only one body in the world which I can 
control without having to perform any other intentional action. I can of 
course control the movement of many objects in the world. I can push you 
down the stairs, I can steer my car, I can make a bullet speed through 
space. But when I make you or my car or a bullet move, I make it move 
by making my own body move. I move my body against you, and there-
by push you. In the car, I move my hands to make the steering wheel 
move, which makes the wheels move, which makes the car move in one 
direction rather than another. When I make the bullet move, I do so by 
moving my finger against the trigger, which makes hammer snap and 
thereby makes the detonator explode and the bullet speed out of the barrel 
of the gun. But when I move the physical object that is my body, I do not 
have to move it by making some other physical object move. I have, in 
one sense of the word, direct control over at least some of what my body 
does. So I am uniquely related to one and only one body in the world in 
terms my power of voluntary agency. 
Secondly, the existence and nature of my perceptions of the external 
world depends on the position and condition of one and only one body 
and its sensory organs. Trivially, what I can see depends on where in 
space this body is located; on whether there are any opaque objects 
between this body's eyes and the putative object seen; on whether this 
body's eyes are open and focused in that direction; on whether light 
waves impinge on this body's eyes, and produce impulses in this body's 
optic nerve and this body's visual cortex; and on. Analogously with the 
other senses: if I am to hear anything, then this body's ears must be affect-
ed by sound waves which cause impulses in this body's auditory nerve; 
whether I can feel any surfaces depends on contact between other objects 
and this body; whether I can smell anything depends on molecules stimu-
lating the nose of this body; and so on. Other bodies can of course make a 
difference to what I perceive. I can change what I see by turning this 
body's head (and hence this body's eyes and line of sight); but equally you 
can change what I see, e.g. by moving your body into my field of vision, or 
more dramatically by punching me on the head and disrupting my visual 
powers. But the sort of dependence which I have on this body for my per-
ception of the world around me is different in kind from the kind of depen-
dence on all other bodies. 
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So, considerations about intentional activity relate me uniquely to one 
body; and considerations about perceptions of the external world relate 
me uniquely to one body. In the normal case, there is a single body to 
which I am uniquely related in each of these two ways: the body which I 
can move directly is the very same body as the one on whose position and 
condition my perceptions of the world depend. Swinburne now claims 
that to say that a body is mine is to say I am related to it in these two sorts 
of ways. 
Swinburne next asserts that the set of relations which obtain between 
me and the body which I call my own could cease to hold between me and 
that body, and corne to hold between me and another body. This would 
amount to my changing bodies. It is also logically possible (he urges) that 
the relations which hold between me and my body might cease, and yet I 
remain in existence. 
Suppose [he writes] that [a person] finds himself able to operate on 
and learn about the world within some small finite region, without 
having to use one particular chunk of matter for this purpose. He 
might find himself with knowledge of the position of objects in a 
room (perhaps by having visual sensations, perhaps not, and able to 
move such object just like that, in the ways in which we can know 
about the positions of our limbs and move them ... The person would 
be in no way limited to operating and learning through one particu-
lar chunk of matter. Hence we may term him disembodied.3 
The transformation of a normal embodied person into a disembodied per-
son, as here envisaged, has four stages. Since two are unproblematic and 
two are problematic, it is worth listing them separately. First, we have to 
imagine that I cease to have any direct control over the body which I call 
mine. Secondly, I find that what goes on in the body I call mine makes no 
difference to my perceptual experiences. Light waves impinge on these 
eyes, but no visual experience results for me; sound waves strike the ear 
drum but produce no auditory experience for me; and so on. Thirdly, I 
find that I can, for example, see and hear you speaking in one room, when 
what used to be called my body is in another room down the corridor, or 
in another building, or in another country, or even completely destroyed. 
Fourthly, I find that I can directly control the movements of other objects in 
my environment, in the way in which I used to be able to control at least 
some of the movements of my own body. 
The reason for separating Swinburne's thought experiment into four 
steps is that there is nothing puzzling about either of the first two. 
Someone can indeed lose the power to move their own limbs: they can be 
overtaken by paralysis. And even if the paralysis were absolutely total, so 
that none of their bodily movements was under their control, that would 
surely not be any evidence that perhaps the body was beginning not to be 
"theirs". Equally, there is nothing puzzling about the thought that some-
one can lose the functioning of all their sensory systems, so that they can 
no longer perceive the external environment at all. We are familiar with 
the fact that people go blind, go deaf, lose their senses of taste and smell, 
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etc. Clearly, there is no reason why these afflictions should not strike 
someone simultaneously. And if this were to happen, we would surely 
not be tempted at all to say that the body was no longer "theirs". Even if 
the twin disasters of total paralysis and total sensory deprivation were pre-
sent at the same time, there would still be no temptation to say that the vic-
tim no longer had a body. The body would remain as before the obvious 
focus of our concern about the individual. 
But it is with the third and fourth changes that deep puzzles emerge 
about the idea that it is possible for us to exist without a body, and here I 
want to focus on the third change, that is, on my discovery that I perceive 
the environment but not from (what I used to call) my body, and not from 
any other body either. Swinburne gives us few details (too few, I will 
argue) about what he envisages. It is not even clear that the disembodied 
person is thought of as perceiving the environment, since Swinburne says of 
this being at one point: 
He might find himself with knowledge of the position of objects in a 
room (perhaps by having visual sensations, perhaps not) ... 4 
as if he were envisaging the possibility of non-perceptual knowledge of the 
environment. The problem here is that the more unlike ordinary per-
ceivers the disembodied perceiver is, the more details we need if we are to 
judge whether he could indeed acquire, for example "knowledge of the 
position of objects in a room." For this reason, I will supplement 
Swinburne's account by adding some details which he does not supply. 
First, I shall assume that the disembodied perceiver's putative beliefs 
about the environment are as much like ours as possible in their origin and 
justification. Secondly, I shall assume that the disembodied perceiver does 
have a spatial location, but does not occupy a spatial volume. 
The first line of objection (which I am calling the argument from embod-
iment) starts by reminding us first of how perception of the environment is 
tied to the physical contingencies of our bodies, in much more detailed 
ways than Swinburne has alluded to. For example, I have two eyes and 
not one, and the two eyes are separated in space. Because of this, I am 
able to perceive depth. Again, because I have two spatially separated 
eyes, there is a difference in my visual perception when I look at a scene 
with my head held erect, with my head held at 90° to my right, with my 
head held upside down, with my head held at 90° to my right, and with 
my head at 1800 to the vertical. If I am thought of as able to see things 
when I have no body, and hence as seeing them from a mere geometrical 
point, will I be able to perceive spatial depth visually, and if so how? Will 
I be able to perceive visually changes in the relative orientation of myself to 
the enviroment? Is the idea that I see things from a mere geometrical point 
in space, or that somehow although I have no physical embodiment, my 
visual powers will still be distributed across a spatial region as they are 
now? Again, because I have eyes at the front of my body but not at the 
back, I can see what is in front of me, but have to tum round if I am to see 
what is behind me. But if I have no body, there is nothing to determine in 
which direction I am looking. If I am supposed to be seeing from a geo-
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metrical point in space, it makes no sense to suppose that that point can 
rotate to reveal what is behind me. "In front" and "behind" can have no 
meaning if applied to a perceiver without a body; and neither consequent-
ly can "up" and "down". There can be no variation in the orientation of a 
geometrical point; but such varying orientation is integral to our under-
standing of what the human visual system is. 
Problems of a different kind arise in connection with touch. When we 
use the sense of sight, we can be relatively passive: we do not have to do 
much in order to see. But in relation to our tactual sense, we are typically 
much more active. If I want to feel the shape, or the temperature, or the 
texture of an object, I have to bring my body into contact with it and touch 
it. With smallish objects, T can (e.g.) pick them up in my hands and tum 
them about. Because I have a spatially extended body, I can simultane-
ously feel that a block of wood is rough on top and smooth underneath, or 
hot at one end and cold at the other. But if I do not have any hands or sim-
ilar physical parts with which to feel two different surfaces, nothing could 
determine which surface I was feeling as smooth, and which as rough; 
which end as hot and which as cold. There would be nothing to link 
whatever was going on in me, with features of my environment, in such a 
way that my states could count as perceptions of my environment. 
Further problems arise when we reflect on the fact that we can simulta-
neously see and feel the very same thing; and when this happens, one of 
the things that I see is indeed my body, in contact with with the object 
which I am seeing. Suppose that I am confronted by an array of three balls 
on a table, balls which vary in colour and in degree of smoothness; and 
suppose that my task is to say what colour the smoothest ball is. For the 
embodied pereiver, the task is simple: you can know the colour of the ball 
you are feeling because you can see which ball is in contact with your 
hand. If you have no body, how can you know which of the balls you are 
seeing is the one which you are feeling? 
For reasons of this kind, the idea that we could continue to perceive our 
environment even if we had no body is a good deal more puzzling than 
Swinburne allows. At the very least, we need to be given much more 
detail about what is being envisaged before we should grant that it is even 
prima facie possible.s 
IV 
There is a second line of objection (which I am calling the argument 
from location) against the possibility of disembodied perception. We can 
start by noting first that if a person were disembodied and were perceiving 
his environment, no one else could know that it was happening. Since ex 
hypothesi the person would be non-physical, they would be undetectable by 
anyone else. So if the occurrence of disembodied perception is to be 
detectable at all, it will have to be detectable by the person to whom it is 
supposed to be happening. But here is an argument for saying that that is 
not possible. In what follows, I will focus on the sense of sight, but the 
argument will generalise to the other senses as well. 
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The idea that I am seeing my environment presupposes that I have a 
location from which I do my seeing. If T am in the kitchen, for example, the 
sink but not the television in the living room would be within my visual 
range, whereas if I am in the living room, the television but not the sink 
would be within my visual range. So if I am in the kitchen, and I have 
visual experiences as of seeing the sink, then maybe I really am seeing the 
sink. But if I am in the kitchen, and I have visual experiences as of seeing 
the television, then I am not really seeing the television: I am hallucinating 
it, or misperceiving as the television some other object in the kitchen. 
Similarly, if I am in the living room and I have visual experiences as of see-
ing the television, then maybe I am really seeing the television. But if I 
then have visual experiences as of seeing the kitchen sink, then I am hallu-
cinating or misperceiving. 
So in order for there to be a distinction within my experience between 
genuinely seeing on the one hand, and having visual hallucinations and 
misperceptions on the other, I must have a determinate position in space. 
It is my position in space which partly determines for me at each moment 
what is then genuinely visible by me; and it gives content to the idea that 
visual experiences which are of items that are not currently visible by me 
must be hallucinations or misperceptions, not genuine seeings. In the 
case of a normal embodied perceiver, his position is given by the position 
of his body in space. If his body is in the kitchen, that restricts what he can 
really see to what is visible from within the kitchen. So if he has experi-
ences as of something in the living room, it follows at once that they are not 
genuine seeings. The problem with Swinburne's disembodied perceiver is 
that in order to distinguish between seeing and hallucinating, he must 
have a spatial position; and there is no way of knowing what his spatial 
position is independently of what his experiences of his environment are. 
All that he can say (or rather think) to himself is something of the form "I 
am having some visual experiences of the sink. So if I am in the kitchen, 
maybe I am really seeing the sink; whereas if I am in the living room, then 
I must be hallucinating/misperceiving." But he has no way of determin-
ing which of these "if" clauses is true; and hence no way of determining 
whether he is really perceiving or hallucinating. 
So, the disembodied perceiver cannot draw a distinction between really 
seeing and just hallucinating/ misperceiving. The most that he can know 
is that he has some visual experiences, now of the sink, now of the televi-
sion. But he cannot sort those experiences into cases of genuine seeing 
and of hallucination/misperception. For all he can tell, all of them could 
be hallucinatory. 
Why should this matter to Swinburne's case? The reason is this: if the 
supposedly disembodied perceiver's experiences might all be hallucina-
tions, there is no reason to think that the perceiver is located outside his 
erstwhile body. For although I cannot really see the sink unless the sink is 
within my visual environment, clearly I can hallucinate the sink from any 
position in space. So if a perceiver is having a set of visual "sink" experi-
ences, and there is no reason to think that any of these experiences is non-
hallucinatory, the experiences cannot provide any grounds for thinking 
that the perceiver is located outside his body. And since we agreed at the 
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outset that a disembodied perceiver's supposedly perceptual experiences 
could not give anyone else a reason for saying that he was located outside 
his body, it follows that his perceptual experiences give no reason to any-
one to suppose that he is located outside his body. 
If we try to draw together the threads of the above argument, we get the 
following, which I call the Argument from Location: 
1. The experiences of the supposedly disembodied person (the SOP) 
do not give anyone else a reason to say that he is located outside 
his erstwhile body (premise). 
2. To draw a contrast between really seeing and merely hallucinating 
or misperceiving, there must be an independent check on where 
the perceiver is located (i.e. independent of the phenomenal con-
tent of the perception) (premise). 
3. For the SOP, there is no independent check on where he is located. 
So 
4. The SOP cannot divide his experiences into cases of really seeing 
and cases of hallucination (from 2 and 3). So 
5. He has no reason to reject the thought that all his experiences are 
hallucinations (from 4). 
6. No matter how remote the objects which you hallucinate, you can 
hallucinate them all while remaining "in" your body (premise). 
So 
7. The SOP's experiences give him no reason to think that he is locat-
ed outside his erstwhile body (from 5 and 6). So 
8. His experiences give no one any reason to think that he is perceiv-
ing without a body (from 1 and 7). So 
9. His experiences give no one any reason to think that he is existing 
without a body. 
We have then two plausible lines of argument against the possibility of 
disembodied perception. The first says that our understanding of what 
perception is, is necessarily dependent on facts about human bodies, in 
such a way that we cannot, even in a thought experiment, make sense of 
perception when all these ties have been thought away. The second says 
that even if the first argument is mistaken, and we could still make sense of 
perception under the envisaged conditions, it would be impossible to tell 
which of our experiences were (veridical) perceptions and which were hal-
lucinations. 
It might be thought that there must be a reply to the second argument. 
For the argument presupposes that for a person to know that he is gen-
uinely perceiving something, he must (a) know where he is located, and (b) 
know what is perceivable from his position in space; and further that he 
must know both of these things independently of the content of his current sensory 
state. For it is being supposed to be a necessary condition of his treating 
his current sensory state as a perception, that if so treated it would be a 
perception of something that has been independently determined to be per-
ceivable. But once we put it like this, the assumed preconditions can be 
seen to be unreasonably demanding. For they are not met even by 
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embodied perceivers. In general, if I am required to abstract from the con-
tent of my current sensory states, I cannot tell where I am located in the 
world. I do not first decide where I am located, and then as an epistemo-
logically independent exercise, decide which of my sensory states is a per-
ception and which a hallucination. And in that case, the argument from 
location fails. 
However, this objection to the argument from location is itself flawed. 
We can concede to the objector that a perceiver does not determine where 
he is in complete abstraction from the content of his sensory states. Rather, 
for an embodied perceiver, there is a dialectical interplay: I decide where I 
am on the basis of my current perceptions, and I decide which of my cur-
rent sensory states are to count as genuine perceptions of my environment 
on the basis of where I am. It is a circle, but a virtuous circle. The problem 
with the disembodied perceiver is that this dialectical interplay is impossi-
ble. In the embodied case, where I am determines what is perceivable; 
but the content of claims about where I am is not exhausted by specifying 
anything about my sensory states. I can have a determinate spatial posi-
tion even without having any sensory input at all. By contrast, the disem-
bodied perceiver has no grounds for locating himself anywhere when he is 
not actually perceiving; so when he starts to perceive, having no determi-
nate location, he has no grounds for thinking that this or that scene is or is 
not perceivable by him. At the very least, if he can draw a distinction at all 
between perception and misperception/hallucination, it will be a much 
impoverished one compared with ours. 
v 
Suppose that the conclusion of the last section is wrong, and that 
Swinburne's premise 1. of the Basic Argument is true, and indeed can be 
known or reasonably believed to be true. Suppose, in other words, that it 
is at least possible for me to continue to exist without a body. Swinburne 
argues that it follows from such an assumption that I must now have a non-
bodily soul. 
From the mere logical possibility of my continued existence [without 
a body] there follows the actual fact that there is now more to me 
than my body; and that more is the essential part of myself.6 
This is a reiteration of the Basic Argument, and I now want to argue that 
the argument is invalid, or at least either invalid or question-begging. To 
show what is wrong with this argument, I will produce an argument with 
the same logical form as Swinburne's in which it will be clear that the con-
clusion does not follow from the premises. This will show that the argu-
ment presented by Swinburne fails, at least in the sense that it is not, as he 
claims, formally valid. The line of attack to be pursued here is thus signifi-
cantly different from that in earlier critiques. As Swinburne himself notes 
(01 p.70), all earlier critiques have conceded that the argument is valid. I 
will suggest that the argument must be either invalid or question-begging. 
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Here, then, is the parallel argument Suppose that I have a chess set, and 
I raise the Swinburnean question whether it is true that 
1. It is logically possible for my chess set to continue to exist even in a 
world in which there is no plastic. 
Remember that when Swinburne says that something is logically possi-
ble, he means only that a certain proposition is not self-contradictory. 
So to ask whether 1. is true is equivalent to asking whether 2. is true: 
2. "My chess set continues to exist although there is no plastic in the 
world" is not self-contradictory. 
And surely, we might think, 2. is true: it is not self-contradictory to say 
that my chess set continues to exist even although there is no plastic in 
the world. It could be true if e.g. my chess set is made of wood - and 
my chess set could have been made of wood. So even if it would be 
false to say that my chess set continues to exist if all the plastic in the 
world were destroyed, it is not self-contradictory. But it clearly does 
not follow from 2. that 
3. My chess set must (now, here) already have some non-plastic com-
ponent whose persistence is the persistence of the chess set. 
Of course, if you know that my chess set is in fact made of plastic, you 
can deduce that it will be destroyed in a world in which all plastic is 
destroyed. And similarly, if you know that it is made of wood, you can 
deduce that it can survive in a world in which all the plastic has been 
destroyed. But that means that you have to know what it is made of before 
you can decide whether it can exist in a world in which all the plastic has 
been destroyed. 
Suppose we now apply these reflections to Swinburne's argument. We 
are granting him the premise of the Basic Argument that 
1. It is logically possible for me to continue to exist without my body 
or any part of it such as my brain. 
where that premise means 
2. "1 continue to exist in a world with no human bodies" is not self-
contradictory. 
But that does not imply 
3. 1 (now, here) already have some non-bodily component, whose 
persistence is the persistence of me. 
If you know that I am in fact a human body, you can deduce that 1 will 
be destroyed in a world in which all human bodies are destroyed. And 
similarly, if you know that I am a non-bodily "soul", you can deduce that 1 
can survive in a world in which all the human bodies have been destroyed. 
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But that means that you have to know what I am (what I am made of) 
before you can decide whether I can exist in a world in which all human 
bodies have been destroyed. 
VI 
It might be objected to this criticism of Swinburne's argument that it 
overlooks the fact that limy chess set" and similar terms can be interpreted 
in two ways. On the first interpretation, limy chess set" is a description 
which applies to anything which satisfies the two conditions (a) of being a 
chess set, and (b) of being mine. Since something could meet these two 
conditions whether it was made of plastic or not, the phrase limy chess set" 
could have true application in a plasticless world even if in the world as it 
currently is, the phrase applies only to a set of wholly plastic objects. My 
chess set could still exist in a plasticless world only because the reference of 
limy chess set" could be different in that world from what it is in the actual 
world. In other words, on the first interpretation, limy chess set" is (in 
Kripke's terms) a non-rigid designator.8 
But on the second interpretation, limy chess set" has an indexical ele-
ment. It means something like "this very chess set, which as a matter of 
fact is mine". The phrase is then a rigid designator: it picks out the same 
object in all possible worlds. And if it is a rigid designator, it could not 
pick out the object which is my chess set (this very set) in a plasticless 
world because this very set would not exist in a plasticless world. This 
remains true even if in the plasticless world of the future I corne to own a 
new (wooden) chess set, and hence can truly apply the phrase limy chess 
set" in that world. 
Since "I" is a rigid designator, there will be a parallel between the "chess 
set" argument and Swinburne's argument only if we adopt the rigid desig-
nator interpretation of limy chess set". And if we do adopt that interpreta-
tion, we see that 2. of the Chess Set Argument does imply 3. For if this 
very thing, my chess set, can survive in a world in which there is no plastic, 
then this very thing must have a non-plastic part (and we might add, a part 
of sufficient importance to ensure that its survival is the survival of the 
chess set). In a parallel way, so the criticism will continue, once we appre-
ciate that "I" functions as a rigid designator, we can see that in the Basic 
Argument, premise 1, understood as 2. does indeed imply 3, and hence 4. 
For if this very thing that I designate by "I" survives in a world without 
any human bodies, this very thing, I, must now have a part which is non-
bodily. Thus, the chess set objection to Swinburne fails. 
VII 
But this criticism of the objection to Swinburne's argument in fact fails. 
Suppose that we grant that "I" cannot have a non-rigid reading, and we 
therefore compare the rigid reading of the chess argument with a rigid 
reading of the dualism argument. On the rigid reading, 1. in the Chess Set 
argument means 
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"This actual object (my chess set) exists in a world in which there is 
no plastic" is not self-contradictory. 
We can agree that if this is true, it implies that (to paraphrase Swinburne) 
there is more to this actual object than plastic, and that more is the essential 
part of the chess set. But if I am to know that that claim is true, then I have 
to know what my chess set is made of; and hence I cannot non-question-
beggingly use that claim to prove what my chess set is made. In particular, 
I cannot use it as a non-question-begging way of establishing 3. 
In a parallel way, on the rigid (and only possible) reading of 1. in the 
Basic Argument, it means 
"This actual object, I, exists in a world in which there is no human 
body" is not self contradictory. 
As with the chess argument, we can agree that if this is true, it implies that 
there is more to this actual object than a human body, and that the more is 
the essential part of the I. But if I am to know that 1. is true, then I have to 
know what the I is made of; and hence I cannot non-question-beggingly 
use 1. to prove what the I is made of. In particular, I cannot use 1. as a 
non-question-begging way of establishing 3. and 4. 
VIII 
There is one final objection to this criticism of Swinburne.9 Swinburne 
casts his argument in the familiar language of logical possibility and 
impossibility, of contradiction, of entailment; and he operates with a famil-
iar-sounding contrast between what logic requires and what the laws of 
nature require. The preceding criticism of Swinburne has assumed that he 
intends these terms to be taken in a narrow sense, perhaps akin to the 
Quinean explication of analyticity. 
But (so the objection would go) Swinburne is operating with a different 
sense of "logically possible" and related terms, a sense more akin to what 
Plantinga has called "broadly" logically possible, or others have called 
metaphysically possible. Let us label the Quinean concept of possibility 
"narrow", and the broad Plantingan concept "metaphysical". 10 
Metaphysical possibility is meant to be a more demanding concept than 
narrow possibility, in the sense that everything which is metaphysically 
possible is logically possible, but not vice versa. 
So, Swinburne's argument is using the (rich) premise that it is meta-
physically possible to perceive without one's body, not the (impoverished) 
premise that it is logically possible. And (the objection would continue) if 
the argument has this richer premise, then it is indeed formally valid. 
The problem with this objection is that it rescues the Swinburnean argu-
ment from one objection only to leave wide open to another. I argued in 
sections 5 to 7 above that Swinburne's argument was not valid (that was 
the burden of the chess argument). But if to make the argument valid, the 
premises are to be taken in a metaphysical rather than a narrow sense, the 
objection then becomes that the premises are false. More specifically, it is 
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not metaphysically possible that I could perceive my environment if I had 
no body (as argued in sections 3 and 4 above), and hence we have been 
given no reason to accept the intermediate conclusion which Swinburne 
draws from this, namely that it is metaphysically possible for me to exist 
without my body. And without this premise, the basic Swinburnean argu-
ment will collapse. 
IX 
This conclusion (that the argument is either invalid or question-begging) 
converges on a recent criticism of Swinburne's argument by Hasker. 
Hasker argues that Swinburne's argument relies on a premise which 
Swinburne summarises as follows: 
[it] says, loosely in words, that it is logically possible that I who am 
conscious in 1984 should go on existing in 1985, even if my body is 
destroyed at the end of 1984 - whatever else might be the case in 1984 
compatible with my conscious existence (and the subsequent destruc-
tion of my body).l1 
Call this proposition X. Hasker says in effect that since X is not self-evi-
dent, the only way to test it is to assess putative counter-examples. He 
puts forward as a counter-example "It is not the case that I have a soul in 
1984" (call this proposition Y), and argues that one could not have a reason 
for rejecting Y that did not consist in a prior commitment to X. 
My argument of sections V to VII goes beyond Hasker's in showing in 
detail how in one sense, the logical possibility of truly applying the term 
"T" both before and after the destruction of stuff Sl does not imply that the 
current referent of "T" is made of something other than Sl (this is the bur-
den of the plastic chess set example construed non-rigidly). It also shows 
how, if you can know that the referent of "T" will survive the destruction 
of stuff Sv you can infer that the referent is made of something other than 
Sl - but that this requires you to know antecedently what the referent is 
made of (this is the burden of the plastic chess example construed rigidly). 
Interpreted in the first way, the Swinburne argument is non-question-beg-
ging but invalid; interpreted in the second way, it is valid but question-
begging. My objection, then, to Swinburne does not merely argue, as 
Hasker does, that Swinburne's argument is question-begging: it also pro-
vides a possible explanation of why Swinburne should nevertheless think 
that it is sound, by showing that the question-begging argument which he 
accepts is very similar to (and can indeed be expressed in the same words 
as) a non-question-begging (albeit invalid) argument. 
Swinburne in his reply to Hasker rejected the claim that his argument 
was question-begging; for he said, it was possible to accept the key 
premise (i.e. X above) and not even understand the conclusion, let alone 
accept it as true. And the grounds for accepting the key premise are 
... the coherence of various thought experiments described in two 
pages of my text [ES pp.151-2 - the ones described in section III 
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above] including ones easily graspable by seven year old religious 
believers or readers of fairy stories.12 
But this reply surely confuses two ways in which we can take the appeal 
to thought experiments. Of course a scenario that is not described in 
much detail and which occurs as part of an engaging narrative can be 
"understood" and "easily grasped by a seven year old". It is in this sense 
that I might be able to "grasp" narratives involving time travel, the split-
ting of one person into two or more people, one person" changing bodies" 
with another, or a person "proving" some mathematical hypothesis that is 
in fact self-contradictory. Imaginary scenarios of this kind (thought exper-
iments, in one sense of the term) obviously tell us nothing at all about what 
is logically possible. A thought experiment which will tell us about possi-
bilities and necessities must at the least be one in which the envisaged sce-
nario can be spelled out in as much detail as anyone cares to demand, with 
no impossibilities emerging. In section III, I argued that Swinburne's 
thought experiment (of imagining my perceptual life continuing without a 
body) did not meet this condition: impossibilities did emerge when we 
tried to make sense in detail of what Swinburne was envisaging, even if 
they were not the sort which would prevent an enjoyment of the imagined 
scenario e.g. for fictional purposes. But even if that argument is wrong, 
there remains the argument of sections V to VII, which explains why, even 
if Swinburne's thought experiment is possible, it cannot non-question-beg-
gingly be used to support his dualist conclusion. 
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